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TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF FAKE GOODS IN CHINA
J. Francesca Gross†
Abstract
Christian Louboutin. Manchester United. Agent Provocateur. In a
world where trademarks have become more than brand identifiers,
counterfeit versions of brands should be easily identifiable. Yet
counterfeiting regimes from Asian countries continue to funnel
counterfeit goods through the United States and European Union
borders. Both regions continue to impose stricter anti-counterfeiting
laws and regulations. Nevertheless, companies in the United States,
Italy, and France are drastically affected by counterfeiting, losing
billions per year in revenue. The International Chamber of
Commerce’s (“ICC”) Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and
Piracy (“BASCAP”) and the International Trademark Association
(“INTA”) estimate that the value of international and domestic trade
in counterfeit and pirated goods in 2013 ranged from $710–$917
billion. BASCAP and INTA predict that by 2022, the value of business
in counterfeit and pirated goods could reach $991 billion.
Asian countries produce more than 70% of all counterfeit goods
with the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and Hong Kong as the
leading provenance economies for counterfeiting. China’s
proliferation of counterfeit goods stems from economic, social, and
political forces that influence China’s socialist market economy. On
average, 20% of consumer products in the Chinese market are
counterfeit goods. The counterfeiting industry continues to cripple
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various countries including the United States, Italy, and France,
costing corporations billions in revenue and placing consumers in
significant financial and health risk. The substantial impact of
counterfeiting on the global economy has spurred the United States,
Italy, and France to impose strict anti-counterfeiting laws and
regulations. The United States anti-counterfeiting arsenal to protect
trademark owners includes civil enforcement under the Lanham Act
15 U.S.C. § 1051 and criminal enforcement under 18 U.S.C. § 2320.
Italy and France impose similar laws and regulations but also take
their anti-counterfeiting mechanism further by seeking stricter
criminal penalties for manufacturers, distributors, and consumers.
This Article explains the regulatory and legal anti-counterfeiting
mechanisms adopted by the United States and the European Union,
specifically Italy and France, to illustrate the international legal and
regulatory tools used to reduce the economic hardships of
counterfeiting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Trademarks continue to possess significant value in our lives.
Despite the high influx of trademark counterfeiting, trademarks have
become more than just brand identifiers. Trademarks are a method of
communicating status, wealth, education, and interest as well as a
source of employment in a capitalistic society. In the United States,
trademark-intensive companies are on the United States Patent and
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) top fifty registered companies list for
those domestically or internationally registered and randomly selected
for the study.1 Trademark-intensive companies directly account for
roughly 23.7 million jobs and 85% of all IP-intensive employment.2
In the EU, trademark-intensive industries account for 65.4 million
direct or indirect jobs or roughly 30.3% of all employment.3
Trademark-intensive sectors account for 35.9% of the EU’s global
domestic product.4
Counterfeiting continues to see growth as a multi-billion-dollar,
global industry that flourishes and causes economic harm to trademark
owners, consumers, and company beneficiaries. According to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and the European Union Intellectual Property Office’s (EUIPO) 2016
Report on the Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy
(“OECD/EUIPO Report”), trade in counterfeit and pirated goods
accounted for as much as 2.5% of the value of international trade, or
$461 billion, in 2013.5 Notably, this figure represents an increase of

1. See U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
UNITED
STATES
ECONOMY:
2016
UPDATE
8
(2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept201
6.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9W7-3P65].
2. Id. at 10.
3. Intellectual Property Rights Intensive Industries and Economic Performance
in the European Union, at 8, EUIPO (Oct. 2016), https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnelweb/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/IPContributio
nStudy/performance_in_the_European_Union/performance_in_the_European_Uni
on_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/C46H-G7HF].
4. Id.
5. Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact,
OECD/EUIPO, at 11 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252653-en
[https://perma.cc/KDB3-N3U2] (hereinafter “OECD/EUIPO Trade in Counterfeit
Report”).
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more than 80% of the findings in the OECD’s 2008.6 In 2013,
domestic and international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods
reached between $710–$917 billion.7 The most significant number of
seized counterfeit merchandise hails from the PRC and Hong Kong.
As counterfeiting has evolved to become a more sophisticated
venture, countries are rallying together to combat the exponentially
growing threat to international trade. The International
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition Inc. (“IACC”) is a District of Columbia
nonprofit organization devoted solely to combating counterfeiting and
piracy. Formed in 1979 with a handful of companies seeking
intellectual property protection, the IACC has grown to a membership
base of over 250 companies from more than forty countries
worldwide. IACC’s membership includes a cross-section of
businesses and industries, including companies from automotive,
apparel, luxury goods, pharmaceuticals, food, software, and
entertainment.8
IACC works to combat counterfeiting, a threat that is the result of
criminal enterprises in Asia, centralized to China’s southern
provinces.9 In 2013, counterfeiting and piracy in Asia accounted for
$310 billion.10 China continues to account for the largest share of the
global counterfeiting total at $143 billion, or 46%.11 Cities like
Guangdong, China, produce most of the counterfeit goods funneled
into the United States and the European Union, particularly Italy and
France.12 China’s proliferation of counterfeit goods stems from
societal and economic issues within the country, including local
governments aiding the creation of distribution channels needed for
6. Id.
7. Frontier Economics, The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy,
INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.iccwbo.be/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/ICC-BASCAP-INTA-2016-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RZA-8JEF].
8. History & Mission, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL. INC.,
https://www.iacc.org/about/history-mission [https://perma.cc/A6KZ-VYVU].
9. See Tina Cassidy, Bagging the Knockoffs: There’s Nothing Like the Real
Thing, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 26, 2002) (noting Nancy Kratzer, Assistant Director
for Fraud Investigations, United States Customs, and Director of the National
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center statement).
10. Frontier Economics, The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy,
INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.iccwbo.be/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/ICC-BASCAP-INTA-2016-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RZA-8JEF].
11. Id.
12. Andrew Yeh, The Complex Trade in Luxury Fakes, FIN. TIMES OF ASIA
(London), Apr. 19, 2006, at 10.
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the manufacturing and distribution of counterfeit goods, local
protectionism, and economic trade of counterfeit goods supporting
local economies.13 Hong Kong’s growth and salience as a transport
point for counterfeiters increases as transport points are misused and
as small parcels of counterfeit cargo go unnoticed and unseized.14
Due to the increase in counterfeiting, law enforcement agencies
increased their raids of counterfeiting shops where police found labels
and patches bearing the counterfeit trademarks already affixed.15
Additionally, members of the counterfeiting syndicates have attached
labels and patches bearing counterfeit trademarks to previously nonbranded items once the merchandise passes through customs in the
respective countries.16 The United States, Italy, and France
implemented stricter laws to combat the growing number of
counterfeit goods entering their borders and restrict counterfeit
syndicates’ cross border trade of goods.
This Comment formulaically analyzes the dilemma of trademark
counterfeiting while outlining the United States’ and European
Union’s legal and regulatory arsenals and proposing potential
solutions to this problem, which affects large and small corporations
globally. Part I discusses the proliferation of trademark counterfeiting
regimes in the PRC and Hong Kong while explaining the economic
and societal effects counterfeiting has on the world. Part II outlines the
United States’ laws and regulations to reduce trademark
counterfeiting. Part III provides a brief overview of the European
Union’s efforts to combat counterfeiting and lays the foundation for
the legal and regulatory framework that Italy and France utilize, while
imposing stricter, countrywide regulations as discussed in Part IV.
Part IV spotlights the Italian and French legal and regulatory regimes.
Part V compares the legal and regulatory arsenals of the United States,
Italy, and France to identify which of the three nations has stricter laws
to help trademark owners and curb the increasing rate of counterfeit
goods. Part V argues that the legal and regulatory arsenals of the
United States, Italy, and France provide minimal assistance to stall
counterfeit production in the PRC and Hong Kong. This Part also
13. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in The People’s Republic of China,
78 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 3–7 (2000).
14. Id.
15. George James, Agents Raid Production Line in Queens for Fake Labels, N.Y.
TIMES, at B3, (Sept. 28, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/28/nyregion/age
nts-raid-production-lines-in-queens-for-fake-labels.html [https://perma.cc/D4F5KDK7].
16. Id.
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presents potential solutions, requiring international diplomacy, to curb
the adverse effects of counterfeiting. This Comment concludes with
an optimistic perspective about the future of anti-counterfeiting.
II. COUNTERFEITING IN THE PRC & HONG KONG
The PRC and Hong Kong remain the most extensive, mass
producers of counterfeit goods because of economic and local
protectionism, which protects counterfeiters more than trademark
owners.17 The PRC and Hong Kong transitioned from a centrally
planned economic system to a more market-based economy known as
the socialist market economy (“SME”).18 SME is a system grounded
in the superiority of public ownership and state-owned enterprises
within a market economy.19 SME enables counterfeiters to thrive
because the economy relies on the state-owned ownership of
production and people.20 Although many factors aid the PRC’s and
Hong Kong’s counterfeiting economic marketplace, the most salient
factors are local protectionism affecting governance and enforcement,
free trade zones, and brand owner’s relationship with the PRC and
Hong Kong.
A. Local Protectionism Affecting Governance & Enforcement
Local protectionism of counterfeiting marketplaces affects
governance, civil, and criminal enforcement in the PRC and Hong
Kong. Local and national governance issues throughout the PRC and
Hong Kong fuel the counterfeiting industry’s growth because a
centralized system does not exist to monitor, regulate, and eradicate
counterfeit syndicates throughout both areas. Local governments have
little interest in regulating counterfeiting because it has become
immensely profitable for the government to collect revenue from
distribution, manufacturing, shipping, and trademark owners.21
17. Yeh, supra note 12.
18. The
World
Factbook,
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-worldfactbook/geos/ch.html [https://perma.cc/D35C-YH9M].
19. Xiaoqin Ding, The Socialist Market Economy: China and the World, Vol.
73, No. 2 SCI. & SOC’Y 235, 237–38 (2009) (explaining that the socialist economic
system at its primary stage is explicitly stipulated in Article 6 of the PRC
Constitution. The basis of such economy is socialist public ownership of the means
of production, namely, ownership of the whole people and collective ownership by
the working people.).
20. Id.
21. See Joyce Chang, Trademark Counterfeiting In China: The Real Price Of
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Through the administrative agencies, local governments often collect
fees from trademark owners to pursue counterfeiters while
simultaneously raiding counterfeiting syndicates only to charge an
additional fee for the counterfeits to receive their merchandise.22
Without counterfeiting and fee collection, many employed citizens
would struggle to find work, increasing poverty and homelessness in
the PRC and Hong Kong.23 Local governments seek to benefit from
the very enterprise they are tasked with regulating, presenting a
striking conflict of interest that hinders trademark owner’s ability to
protect their marks in the PRC and Hong Kong.24 The financial
benefits for local governments outweigh the harm of counterfeiting
costs; therefore, the Chinese do not have an incentive to restrict
counterfeiting trade because of the direct, yet varied, revenue each
province receives.25
Also, the local government’s control mechanisms make it
exceptionally difficult for insurgent officials in the government to
reduce counterfeiting.26 Incumbent government officials who support
counterfeiting are often involved in the local election systems, which
works for counterfeiter’s benefit.27 The incumbent officials are
routinely involved in the nomination and selection process of the
province’s judges, police officers, and administrative enforcement
officials.28 The election of administrative enforcement officials
remains salient because the Administration of Industry and Commerce
(“AIC”) and the Technical Supervision Bureau (“TSB”) oversee much
of the trademark counterfeiting enforcement process.29 The AIC’s
enforcement authority is based on its jurisdiction over all aspects of
trademarks.30 The TSB has authority over product quality and
consumer protection issues, including the authority to bring
enforcement actions against counterfeit products of inferior quality
Knock-Offs, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765, 781 (2014) (citing Daniel C.K. Chow,
Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China: How a
Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 756
(2010)).
22. See Chow, supra note 14, at 30–31.
23. Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National
Companies in China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41
GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 755 (2010); see also Ding, supra note 18, at 239–41.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Chang, supra note 21, 750-757.
27. Chang, supra note 20, at 781.
28. Id.
29. Chow, supra note 14, at 22.
30. Id.
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and products that defraud or harm consumers.31 If these individuals
choose to act contrary to the local government’s objectives, they risk
retaliatory action such as job termination, demotion, or reduced
income.32 The pressure of enforcement officials relinquishing anticounterfeiting measures to local leaders outweighs the enforcement
official’s motivation to enforce laws against counterfeiters, thereby
making enforcement unsustainable.33
Local and national government control makes it difficult for law
enforcement officials and the judicial system to prosecute
counterfeiters.34 With the local government selecting administrative
enforcement officials, such officials rarely transfer counterfeiting
cases from the respective agency to the judicial system.35 The lack of
transfer means that the cases do not get prosecuted. The next hurdles
are collecting evidence and overcoming the Chinese court’s
evidentiary standards, even if administrative enforcement moves cases
to the judicial system.36 In the PRC and Hong Kong, it is not easy to
gather evidence because counterfeiters engage in complex, often
undocumented trade routes.37 The complexity of trade routes leaves
little to no physical evidence to present in judicial proceedings.38
Additionally, trademark owners cannot satisfy the strict evidentiary
standards because Chinese courts require physical evidence of prior
sales in the form of account books, sales orders, sales receipts, tax
receipts, or any other form of direct physical evidence.39 Counterfeit
goods seized on the premises, counterfeit packaging, or the equipment
used in the manufacture of counterfeit goods are not considered
sales.40 The prerequisite of direct physical evidence creates a
substantial obstacle to establishing criminal liability.41
B. Free Trade Zones
In addition to local protectionism, free trade zones (“FTZs”) enable
counterfeiter’s continued mission of expanding their fake-goods
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 21.
Chang, supra note 20, at 781.
Id.
Chow, supra note 14, at 33.
Id.
Id.
Chow, supra note 14, at 35.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 34–35.
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empires while infringing trademarks. FTZs are areas “within which
goods may be landed, handled, manufactured, or reconfigured and
reexported without the intervention of the customs authorities.”42 Such
areas become subject to the prevailing customs duties only when the
goods are moved to consumers within the country in which the zones
are located.43 FTZs are systematized based on seaports, international
airports, and national frontiers, all of which have many geographic
advantages for trade.44 In their least appealing manifestation, FTZs
represent no more than ringfenced enclaves that provide multinational
organizations tax relief while employees, many of whom are women,
slave in sweatshops and garment factories.45
There are an estimated 3,500 FTZs in more than 130 economies,
employing 66 million people and generating more than $500 billion in
direct-rate-related-value added to the global economy.46 Nevertheless,
FTZs provide an opening for counterfeiters to transport shipments of
cargo using the established supply chain lines, which have little to no
oversight.47 Although FTZs are considered great opportunities for
business activity advancement and tax incentives, these zones,
combined with weak governance structures, are a breeding ground for
counterfeiters to continue shipping goods.48 FTZs have much of what
a counterfeiter could hope for: a low-cost foothold in a host territory;
concentrated industrial facilities equipped for transformation,
relabeling, and repackaging; low labor costs; and a withdrawn
oversight philosophy with the ability to assimilate with legitimate
businesses.49 Without stricter customs and border patrol measures to
inspect FTZs, counterfeiters continue to benefit from the lack of
enforcement at trademark owners expense.50
42. Free-trade zone, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/free-trade-zone [https://perma.cc/ZP39-X3ZL].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Piotr Stryskowski & Bill Below, Free Trade Zones: A Free Ride for
Counterfeiters?,
OECD
ON
THE
LEVEL
(Mar.
23,
2018),
https://oecdonthelevel.com/2018/03/14/free-trade-zones-a-free-ride-forcounterfeiters/ [https://perma.cc/V3HF-XV39].
46. OECD/EUIPO, Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Free Trade Zones: Evidence
from Recent Trends, OECD ILIBRARY 16 (Mar. 15, 2018) https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/9789264289550-en.pdf?expires=1614899055&id=id&accna
me=ocid177419&checksum=77045C436C19B801EC051AD642E0EAA9
[https://perma.cc/94LA-GNZT] (hereinafter “OECD/EUIPO Free Trade Zones”).
47. Stryskowski & Below, supra note 41, at 13.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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A link exists between the largest FTZ and the countries with the
largest counterfeit industries.51 In the PRC and Hong Kong, the ties
between local governance and little FTZ oversight exacerbates the
growing presence of counterfeit organizations. It is no wonder that the
PRC and Hong Kong remain breeding grounds for counterfeit
syndicates when you combine the local governance and enforcement
issues with low FTZ oversight, lack of available evidence, and
financial and employment incentives that governments and citizens
receive. 52
C. Relationships Between Trademark Owners and the PRC and
Hong Kong
Trademark owners have a unique yet dysfunctional relationship
with the PRC and Hong Kong.53 The PRC and Hong Kong are the
leading locations for manufacturing and exporting.54 China became a
member of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),55 and it has free
trade agreements with several nations including the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), Australia, New Zealand,
Pakistan, South Korea, and Switzerland.56 With a labor force of 807.75
million people57 and being the headquarters to 119 Fortune 500
companies,58 one would think that China would be more friendly
towards trademark owners. But the PRC and Hong Kong remain two
of the largest intellectual property rights infringers because such rights
do not align with the Chinese values, and the regions have financially
benefited from counterfeiting so much that reducing counterfeiting
would cripple provinces.59 Yet trademark owners continue to pour
51. OECD/EUIPO Free Trade Zones, supra note 42, at 47.
52. Id.
53. Chow, supra note 14, at 25.
54. Chris Devonshire-Ellis, Understanding China’s Free Trade Agreements,
China
Briefing
(Feb.
10,
2014),
https://www.chinabriefing.com/news/understanding-chinas-free-trade-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/CK5F-AUTD].
55. China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 26, 2020, 9:32 AM),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/WM46-3RW2].
56. Id.
57. Labor Force in China from 2008 to 2018, STATISTA (May 27, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/282134/china-labor-force/
[https://perma.cc/TM5Y-9X3L].
58. Global
500
List,
FORTUNE
MAGAZINE,
https://fortune.com/global500/2019/search/?hqcountry=China
[https://perma.cc/8QQ6-S5P3].
59. Chow, supra note 14, at 18.
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billions of dollars into the PRC and Hong Kong without demanding
drastic structural changes to support a reduction in counterfeiting.60
Businesses pour billions of dollars into the PRC and Hong Kong but
businesses only use a small percentage of the money in advertising
and merchandise to combat counterfeiting.61 Trademark owners also
continue to seek manufacturing and distribution services for their
goods in the region.62 However, trademark owners do not alienate the
PRC and Hong Kong because executives fear retaliation by the
Chinese government, which could damage businesses and national
economies for decades.63 Nevertheless, foreign trademark owners
often lobby their governments to impose stricter legal and regulatory
measures to prevent Chinese counterfeit merchandise from entering
and flowing throughout their respective countries.
III. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL & REGULATORY ANTICOUNTERFEITING ARSENAL
According to the Lanham Act,64 a counterfeit is a “spurious mark
that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a
registered mark.”65 For the Lanham Act to apply, the counterfeit mark
must be used “in connection with services or goods that are nearly
identical to the services and goods for which the true trademark or
service mark was registered.”66 If a third party uses the same
trademark or service mark on goods and services that are related but
not identical, then the trademark owner must resort to trademark
infringement as the cause of action.67
As a state and federal crime, counterfeiting involves the
manufacturing or distribution of goods under someone else’s name
without their permission.68 Counterfeit goods are generally made from
lower quality components to sell a cheap imitation of similar goods
produced by brands that consumers know and trust.69 Although
60. Id. at 47.
61. Id. at 47 n.157.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 47.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (explaining the definition of a counterfeit).
65. Id.
66. Trademark Counterfeiting: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/trademark-counterfeiting
[https://perma.cc/A9HW4JSK].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Tiffani L. McDonough, Piecing It All Together: The Amendment to the
Federal Trademark Counterfeiting Act Prevents Circumvention Through
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trademark counterfeiting is a lucrative crime, companies in the United
States lose upwards of $600 billion per year.70 This Part covers some
of the federal statutes used to reduce trademark counterfeiting.
Subsection A discusses the federal laws that impose civil and criminal
penalties on counterfeiters. Subsection B analyzes International Trade
Commission (“ITC”) 19 U.S.C. § 1337, the use of exclusion orders to
combat counterfeiting, and the United States Customs and Border
Patrol (“CBP”) enforcement of ITC regulations. Finally, Subsection C
analyzes the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(“RICO”) Act71—the primary criminal law utilized to protect
trademark owners against counterfeiting syndicates.
A. The Lanham Act & Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act, which provides
trademark owners with a plethora of protection against counterfeiting,
including forfeiture of profits to the rightful trademark owner and
seizure and destruction of all counterfeit merchandise.72 Also, the Act
enables trademark owners to receive compensatory damages to
remedy past trademark counterfeiting.73
Both the Lanham Act74 and the Trademark Counterfeiting Act
(“TCA”) of 198475—the two federal statutes that create civil and
criminal liability for trademark infringement—define the term
“counterfeit” vaguely and broadly. However, the designation of a
mark as “counterfeit,” rather than merely infringement, significantly
increases the civil remedies and criminal penalties available to punish
the defendant for misusing a trademark in this manner. The Lanham
Act addresses the establishment of trademark rights as well as civil
anti-counterfeiting enforcement.76
Component Parts, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 69, 73 (2007).
70. Id. at 76.
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012).
72. Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2012)).
73. See PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY
AND THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY, at 8, (1999).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012) (discussing why Congress criminalized trademark
counterfeiting, via the TCA, because it found that the “penalties under the Lanham
Act have been too small, and too infrequently imposed, to deter counterfeiting
significantly.”).
76. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, §
1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178 (1984); Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996).
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United States counterfeiting laws are more trademark-owner
friendly, aiding owners in seeking civil and criminal sanctions against
counterfeiters. For example, the definition of counterfeit trademark in
section 45 of the Lanham Act77 requires trademark registration to
establish a prima facie case for infringement under the law.78 Liability
for counterfeiting requires a greater degree of copying than mere
trademark infringement. Counterfeiting requires more than the
accused trademark to be “identical or indistinguishable” from
another’s registered trademark. Trademark infringement liability
requires only:
 a colorable imitation of a registered mark that is likely “to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”; or
 in the case of an unregistered mark, the use of a name,
symbol, term, or device that is “likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.”79
The standard for trademark infringement remains easier to overcome
than that for “counterfeit” marks. According to the United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”),80 the government must show the
following to prove that a trademark was counterfeit:
 The mark is spurious. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(1)(a). A mark is
“spurious” if it is “not genuine or authentic.”81
 The mark was used in connection with trafficking in goods
or services.82
 The mark is “identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from” the genuine trademark.83
 The genuine mark is registered on the principal register in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.84
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
78. Id.
79. §§ 1114, 1125(a).
80. 1715. Trademark Counterfeiting—Requirements for a “Counterfeit Mark”,
D.O.J.,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1715trademark-counterfeiting-requirements-counterfeit-mark [https://perma.cc/D5FW946X].
81. Id.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
83. See § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii); see also Department of Justice, Criminal Resource
Manual Section 1715 Trademark Counterfeiting—Requirements for A “Counterfeit
Mark,” (Sept 27, 2020 6:02 PM) https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminalresource-manual-1715-trademark-counterfeiting-requirements-counterfeit-mark
[https://perma.cc/D5FW-946X].
84. See § 2320(f)(1)(A)(ii); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1057 (explaining that
this element limits the class of trademarks covered by the statute, and establishing
the basis for federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, since use in commerce
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The genuine mark is in use. The genuine mark must not only
be registered, it must also be in use.85
 The goods or services are those for which the genuine mark
is registered.86
 The use of a counterfeit mark is “likely to cause confusion,
to cause the mistake, or to deceive.”87
Building upon the Lanham Act, Congress passed the TCA to
combat the rise in counterfeiting by criminalizing the intentional
trafficking of counterfeit goods or services by counterfeiters who
“knowingly” use a counterfeit mark.88 The knowledge standard
requires that the counterfeiter “is aware,” “has a firm belief to the
effect,” or is “willfully blind” to the mark being counterfeit.89 Under
the TCA, violations of the Lanham Act’s anti-counterfeiting
provisions are a federal, criminal offense. The government must
establish that: (1) the defendant trafficked or attempted to traffic in
goods or services; (2) the trafficking or attempted trafficking was
intentional; (3) the defendant used a counterfeit mark on or in
connection with such goods or services; and (4) the defendant knew
the mark used was counterfeit.90 A defendant can be prosecuted for
assisting in the trafficking of counterfeit goods regardless of the intent
to defraud consumers or trademark owners.91 The penalties are as
follows:

is a requirement for registration); § 1057(b) (citing that registration on the principal
register is prima facie evidence that the mark has been in interstate commerce prior
to registration); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538
(2d Cir. 1956).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
86. Id.
87. § 2320(f)(1)(iv).
88. See § 2320 (a)(1); see also § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii) (explaining that regardless of
whether a defendant knows that a mark, to which the counterfeit mark is identical or
indistinguishable from, is already registered).
89. See Lauren D. Amendolara, Note, Knocking Out Knock-Offs: Effectuating
the Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 800 (2005).
90. See United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 629 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Cone,
714 F.3d 197, 206–207 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing the four elements that the
Government is required to prove to obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320;
however, the term “goods” is not defined in § 2320.).
91. See § 2320 (a)(1); see also § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii) (explaining that regardless of
whether a defendant has knowledge that a mark, to which the counterfeit mark is
identical or indistinguishable from, is already registered).
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(A) if an individual, shall be fined not more than
$2,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both, and, if a person other than an individual, shall be
fined not more than $5,000,000; and (B) for a second
or subsequent offense under subsection (A), if an
individual, shall be fined not more than $5,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if other
than an individual, shall be fined not more than
$15,000,000.92
Unlike traditional trademark infringement where certain types of
emergency relief are not available and sanctions are loose,
counterfeiting is subject to higher civil damages and criminal
penalties.93
B. United States International Trade Commission 19 U.S.C. § 1337
Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,94 the ITC has the
authorization to exclude articles from entry into the United States that
have been found to violate United States intellectual property rights or
where the respondent has committed other unfair acts relating to
imported products. The United States Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) enforced such exclusion orders through an extensive, detailoriented investigation. The trademark owner, accused counterfeiter,
and an ITC-appointed investigative attorney, who operates as a third
party charged with protecting the public interest, all participate in
CBP’s investigative processes.95 CBP has the authority to examine,
inspect, and search vessels, vehicles, cargo, baggage, and persons
entering the United States for any breach of the law.96 CBP adopted
the Lanham Act’s definition of counterfeiting, which enables CBP to
seize goods suspected of trademark counterfeiting.97 CBP will notify
the importer within five days that it has detained the suspected
counterfeit goods; then the importer has seven days to provide
evidence that the goods are not counterfeit.98 If the importer fails to
respond, or if the importer cannot provide sufficient proof, CBP may
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

§ 2320(b)(1).
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012).
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
Id.
19 USC §§ 1581, 1582 (2019).
19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (2019).
§ 133.21(a)(2).
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notify the trademark owner of the detainment and invite the owner to
assist in the examination of the counterfeit goods. This notification
may include: (1) the date of import; (2) the port of entry; (3) the
country of origin; (4) the identity of the importer and manufacturer;
and (5) samples of the goods for authentication.99
If CBP determines that the goods bear a counterfeit mark after
examination, it will seize the goods, and they will be forfeited. To
utilize CBP’s detainment and seizure powers, a trademark owner must
record its trademark registration with the agency; recording may be
done online and costs $190 per class of goods.100 Trademark owners
are strongly encouraged to provide additional information that would
help identify counterfeit goods. Examples of additional information
include physical hallmarks of the goods, geographic origins of
authentic goods, the names of authorized manufacturers or licensees,
and the names of past infringers.101 At the end of the investigation, the
ITC holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the importer
possessed counterfeit goods.102 ITC proceeds are like United States
federal court trials except that the process occurs on an expedited basis
with the ITC determining if the import violates section 337.103 If an
infringer violated section 337, then the ITC may issue an exclusion
order barring counterfeit product from entry into the United States.104
C. Criminal Laws Restricting Trademark Counterfeiting
Another mechanism for combating counterfeiting involves criminal
laws and high penalties to deter trademark counterfeiting. Congress
made use of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 to quietly ensure that counterfeiting trademarked goods
remained a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.105 Section 2320 contains a
99. § 133.21(a)(4).
100. B. Brett Heavner & Yinfei Wu, Procedures and strategies for anticounterfeiting: U.S., WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (May 24, 2018),
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/procedures-andstrategies-anti-counterfeiting-united-states-0 [https://perma.cc/9DHN-S3ZZ].
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Mfg. Indus. Advisor, The Increasingly Popular Section 337, FOLEY &
LADNER LLP (June 21, 2017), https://www.foley.com/the-increasingly-popularsection-337-06-21-2017/ [https://perma.cc/N8VL-B7YP].
104. Id.; see also Lisa Lyne Cunningham, Trademark Counterfeiting and
Individual Purchaser Liability, NAT’L L. REV., (Nov. 11, 2011),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trademark-counterfeiting-and-individualpurchaser-liability [https://perma.cc/J722-7X8N].
105. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
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long list of specified, unlawful activities that could trigger prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957—the statutory provisions of the
Money Laundering Act.106 Additionally, Congress enacted the
Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“ACPA”) to
further increase the civil and criminal penalties for trafficking
counterfeit goods.107 The ACPA also varies the statutory provisions
that federal prosecutors and law enforcement authorities utilize to
combat individuals and operations involved in this illegal activity.108
Federal law also categorizes individuals and operations engaged in
the trafficking of counterfeit goods as racketeers. Congress created the
RICO Act to “eliminate organized crime infiltration and racketeering
into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.”109
Under the RICO Act, rather than prosecute each crime affecting
legitimate businesses, prosecutors may indict individuals or
operations based on a pattern of criminal activity.110 The DOJ and
Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) enforce the RICO Act
through robust investigations and prosecutions. The DOJ Criminal
Manual sections 9.110.010 to 9.110.901 outline the RICO prosecution
process, indictment requirements, and specific RICO activity
prosecution review requirements.
IV. BACKGROUND ON THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO THE
GROWING COUNTERFEITING PROBLEM
The United States and the EU continue to adopt stricter mechanisms
to combat the proliferation of counterfeit goods. As Asian countries
continue to manufacture and distribute a vast majority of the
counterfeit goods, the European Union member states like Italy and
France impose stricter regulations on counterfeiters and consumers.
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22
U.S.C., 27 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
106. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 1956(c)(7)(D)
(2012).
107. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110
Stat. 1386 (1996).
108. Sam Cocks, Comment, The Hoods Who Move the Goods: An Examination
of the Booming International Trade in Counterfeit Luxury Goods and an Assessment
of the American Efforts to Curtail Its Proliferation, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 501, 525–29 (2007).
109. S. REP. NO. 617, at 2 (1969).
110. Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
235, 240 (1999) (discussing the legislative history behind the Anticounterfeiting
Consumer Protection Act of 1996); see Lauren D. Amendolara, 15 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 795–99 (2005).
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The European Union Trademark Regulation (2015/2424/EU)
(“New Regulation”), amending the Community Trademark
Regulation (“Old Regulation”), became effective on March 23,
2016.111 Under the New Regulation, trademark owners can oppose the
transit of goods bearing unauthorized EU trademarks or marks that are
substantially similar. The opposition can occur even if the goods are
not released for free circulation or intended to be sold within the
European marketplace.112 Trademark owners may further contest
other circumstances such as warehousing, FTZs, temporary storage,
inward processing, or provisional admissions.113 Customs authorities
are entitled to take actions outlined in Regulation No. 608/2013 on the
customs enforcement of IP rights, such as detaining shipments
suspected to infringe an EU trademark.114 The owner’s rights to an EU
or nationally registered trademark could lapse if, during the
proceedings initiated to determine whether the registered trademark
has been infringed, the declarant or the holder of the goods provides
evidence that the registered trademark owner should not be entitled to
prohibit the declarant from placing the goods on the market in the
country of final destination.115
Aside from the EU’s Trademark Regulation, some experts
considered EU Customs Regulation 608/2013 the most robust and
cost-efficient mechanism for combating trademark counterfeiting.
This regulation, which took effect on January 24, 2014, repealed the
long-standing EU Regulation 1383/2003.116 Regulation 608/2013
extends the existing system to rights in trade names and removes the
requirement to commence intellectual property infringement
proceedings before suspected counterfeit goods can be destroyed,
111. Trademark Regulation 2015/2424 art. 4, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 88 (EN).
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id.
114. Intellectual Property Rights - Facts and figures, EUR. UNION (Sept. 19,
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/customs-controls/counterfeit
-piracy-other-ipr-violations/ipr-infringements-facts-figures_en [https://perma.cc/M
5RT-MYF8]; Ana Bruder & Konstantin von Werder, The Transit of Goods Under
the New EU Trademark Regulation, ALL ABOUT IP BLOG (May 13, 2016),
https://www.allaboutipblog.com/2016/05/the-transit-of-goods-under-the-new-eutrademark-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/SFF7-8NXT].
115. EUTM Seniority, MEWBURN ELLIS, https://www.mewburn.com/lawpractice-library/eutm-seniority [https://perma.cc/GH93-CN5S].
116. Paola Andreottola, European Union: Trademark owners versus
counterfeiters: the EU customs regime, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/european-uniontrademark-owners-versus-counterfeiters-eu-customs-regime
[https://perma.cc/3HTU-JTMS].
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provided that the declarant or holder of the goods agrees to the
destruction.117 The regulation also introduces procedures enabling
small consignments of counterfeit goods to be destroyed without the
explicit agreement of the rights holder, provided that she makes a
general destruction request.118 The regulation also provides
exemptions for travelers’ luggage but only if the goods are
non-commercial and contained in travelers’ luggage.119 This
exemption serves the unhindered passenger traffic but poses an
excellent source for the influx of counterfeit goods into the EU.120
In 2016, Europol and EUIPO joined forces to create the Intellectual
Property Crime Coordinated Coalition (“IPC3”), which operates
within Europol. IPC3 strengthens the fight against counterfeiting and
piracy online and offline. IPC3 provides operational and technical
support to law enforcement agencies and other partners in the EU and
beyond by facilitating and coordinating cross-border investigations;
monitoring and reporting online crime trends and emerging modi
operandi; raising public awareness of this crime; and providing
training to law enforcement in how to combat it.121 The IPC3 produced
significant results. At the end of its first year of operation, it supported
more than fifty high-priority cases of intellectual property
infringement.122 As the EU expands protections for member states,
some members implemented stricter laws to curb counterfeiting and
reduce the amount of revenue lost each year.
V. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING MEASURES OF ITALY & FRANCE
According to the IACC, the counterfeit goods industry has a global
value of more than $1.7 trillion, making it many times more profitable
than the global drug trade.123 In a report commissioned by the
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also Edward Carrington et al., Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
Toolkit
for
Italy,
U.S.
Com.
Serv.
(Sep.
2007),
https://www.stopfakes.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004q8B
[https://perma.cc/LQ7C-FCW5].
119. Regulation 608/2013 art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L. 181) 19 (EN).
120. See Sandra Rinnert, New European Regulation 608/2013 concerning
combating counterfeit goods, 9 WORLD CUSTOMS J. 37, 38 (2013).
121. Intellectual Property Crime Coordinated Coalition-IPC3, EUROPOL,
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/intellectual-property-crimecoordinated-coalition-ipc3 [https://perma.cc/SQ4M-BD89].
122. Id.
123. Matthew Abbey, Counterfeiters Will Win the Trade War, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Aug. 10, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/10/counterfeiterswill-win-the-trade-war/ [https://perma.cc/85SR-QSTV].
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International Trademark Association and the International Chamber
of Commerce, Frontier Economics, a consultancy based in Europe,
predicted that the global counterfeit industry will have a value of $2.3
trillion by 2022.124 Counterfeit products using marks from the United
States, Italy, France, and Switzerland comprise more than 50% of all
counterfeit goods.
As a result, France and Italy have implemented strict criminal and
civil penalties for counterfeiters and purchasers, which could lead to a
drastic reduction in counterfeiting. Italian and French legislators are
making fruitful attempts to combat the loss of revenue and jobs their
countries experience because of counterfeiting.
A. Italy’s Anti-Counterfeiting Regime
Italian legislators continue to implement laws and regulations
combating counterfeiting. The prevalence of street vendors in Italy
and the high influx of imported counterfeit goods continue to be the
country’s most visible trademark violations.125 Aside from several
treatises that Italy remains a party to, the Code of Industrial Property
(“CIP”) and EU regulations govern much of Italy’s intellectual
property law including trademark registrations and infringements.126
The IPC3 took effect in 2005 via the Decree-Law 30/2005, but
legislators subsequently reformed the IPC3 by Legislative Decree
131/2010.
The Italian Patent and Trademark Office maintains a first-to-file
system in which unregistered marks enjoy less protection than
registered trademarks.127 To enforce claims for both the registered and
unregistered marks, Italy has twenty-one specific sections of civil
courts with one court for each Italian region.128 Where a case includes
a foreign enterprise, only eleven of the venues remain available based
on rules simplifying the courts. 129

124. Id.
125. See Amanda Silverman, Note, Draconian or Just? Adopting the Italian
Model of Imposing Administrative Fines on the Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods,
17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175, 188 (2009).
126. Id.
127. See Fabio Angelini & Simone Verducci-Galletti, Trademark Procedures and
Strategies:
Italy,
WORLD
TRADEMARK
REV.
(Sept.12,
2018),
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/trademark-proceduresand-strategies-italy [https://perma.cc/964L-KUHK].
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Unlike the United States, Italy continues to have some of the most
stringent anti-counterfeiting laws that extend liability to consumers
purchasing counterfeit goods.130 The Italian Penal Code addresses the
issue of liability for engaging in the purchase or sale of counterfeit
items. Article 473 of the Italian Penal Code punishes those who
counterfeit or alter domestic or foreign brands or distinctive marks of
intellectual property or utilize counterfeit or altered brands.131 Also,
the prosecution need only prove that the counterfeiter knew about the
existence of the trademark; then the defense must provide evidence of
excusable ignorance. In contrast to the TCA and ACPA, which each
require some element of specific knowledge that trademark used was
counterfeit,132 article 473 does not impose such a requirement.133
Instead, article 473 appears to impose a less restrictive prosecutorial
standard.
In addition to article 473, article 474 of the Italian Penal Code
imposes penalties for introducing counterfeit goods into the Italian
marketplace.134 The penalties include imprisonment for one to four
years, fines ranging from €3,500 to €35,000 ($4,850 to $48,500), or
both.135 Article 474 provides stricter penalties and separate
punishments for the introduction of counterfeit goods into Italy
compared to holding the goods for sale and circulation.136 Article 474
also imposes liability on businesses that import products from foreign
countries where the production of counterfeit goods is not strictly
regulated.137 Law 231/2001 illustrates that if an employee purchased
counterfeit goods from abroad without the company’s knowledge, the
company could be liable.138

130. Decreto Legge 14 maggio 2005, n. 80/05, art. 1(7), in G.U. May 14, 2005, n.
111
(It.),
available
at
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05080l.htm
[https://perma.cc/C2CN-63PY].
131. Davide Bresner, New counterfeiting regulations in Italy, THOMSON
REUTERS:
PRAC.
LAW,
9
(2009),
https://www.rapisardi.com/rws/home.nsf/0/3A65B311DCF9B7C2C1258451004D
6B92/$FILE/New%20Counterfeiting%20regulations%20in%20Italy%20%20DB.002.002.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4KG-H3M3].
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (a)(1) (2019); see also Anticounterfeiting Consumer
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec.7, § 1117, 110 Stat. 1386, 1388
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(c) (2019)).
133. Bresner, supra note 122, at 9.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id.
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Under Law 99/2009, an update to the Italian Penal Code,
prosecutors can use a party’s subjective knowledge of a trademark or
other intellectual property right as an objective element of the
counterfeiting crime.139 The update also imposes a more realistic
penalty against consumers who purchase counterfeit merchandise. The
administrative fines range from €100 to €7,000 ($140 to $9,700). The
consumer penalties are not as drastic as the penalties for violations that
involve trafficking counterfeit goods.140
Nevertheless, the legislature has eliminated the
requirement that a guilty party must have purchased
counterfeit goods without having first ascertained its
legitimate origin from the definition of the crime.
Instead, liability is based on the goods’ appearance of
illegality, who is selling it, its price, and its quality.141
In addition to the Italian Penal Code, Italy recently implemented a
new EU trademark directive, strengthening trademark protections to
combat counterfeiting. Legislative Decree 15/2019 implemented the
Trademarks Directive, which became effective on March 23, 2019.142
The reinforcement of trademark protection extends to transported
goods using cross-border measures thereby countering individual
preparatory acts of counterfeiting.143 The regulation allows for the
seizure of counterfeit goods in mere transit within EU member
states.144
Over the last three decades, Italy has drastically reformed the
customs system to curb the increasing influx of counterfeit goods
flowing internationally. One mechanism customs utilizes to combat
the threat is the multimedia database, the Fully Automated Logical
System Against Forgery and Fraud (“FALSTAFF”).145 This database
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 12.
142. Giulia Beneduci, Fresh amendments to the Italian Industrial Property Code.
“Trademarks Package” and “Unitary Patent Package” implemented, LEXOLOGY
(Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63d2359e-92944bfd-b2fd-5d6e58d1adad. [https://perma.cc/L7EP-VCUV].
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Giulia Beneduci, Fresh amendments to the Italian Industrial Property Code.
“Trademarks Package” and “Unitary Patent Package” implemented, LEXOLOGY
(Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63d2359e-92944bfd-b2fd-5d6e58d1adad. [https://perma.cc/L7EP-VCUV].
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is updated directly by rights holders that request protection for their
goods. Consumers and customs also frequently update the database.
Customs utilizes the database to gather together information on how
to distinguish counterfeit goods at the borders.146 The database appears
to be an effective mechanism, helping customs enforcement make
more transparent determinations and reducing the need for lengthy
investigations.147
The tax police’s Anti-Counterfeiting System (“SIAC”) uses a
similar and more recent tool, which was co-funded by the European
Commission.148 The Ministry of Internal Affairs described SIAC as
“stemm[ing] from the awareness to face a multi-dimensional and
transversal, illegal phenomenon such as counterfeiting, all
institutional bodies, and players involved in combating the
‘counterfeit industry’ should join forces.”149 Little data is available on
the effectiveness of such databases to combat the influx of counterfeit
goods through various borders. Italy continues to roll out the red carpet
to protect domestic and international trademark owners against
counterfeiting while attempting to curb the financial and employment
losses caused by counterfeiting.
B. France’s Anti-Counterfeiting Model
Like Italy, France continues to implement an extensive legal and
regulatory structure to reduce the effects of counterfeiting goods
flowing through the country’s borders. In France, luxury brands
remain prominent, representing over one quarter of the global, luxury
industry.150 France’s luxury brand industry is nearly three times the
size of the United States luxury brand sector.151 In 1995, French
officials and private agencies created Le Comite National
Anti-Contrefacon (The National Anti-Counterfeiting Committee
(“CNAC”)). The CNAC, along with the Comite Colbert, focuses on
informing consumers about the dangers of counterfeit goods as well
as the possible penalties individuals would face if they purchase or
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2019: Bridging the gap between the old and
the
new,
DELOITTE
25
(Apr.
2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ar/Documents/Consumer_and_In
dustrial_Products/Global-Powers-of-Luxury-Goods-abril-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GZ34-74MV].
151. Id.
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possess any counterfeit goods.152 The Comite Colbert, an organization
comprised of key members of the French luxury industry, notes that
the luxury goods business remains a strategic imperative to France
because of the considerable size, presence, and influence of luxury
designers in the country.153
The French Intellectual Property Code defines counterfeit broadly
and identifies all counterfeiting as an offense.154 Like the United
States, France shares concerns about the considerable consequences
and costs associated with counterfeiting. Counterfeiting financially
impacts industries like the fashion, jewelry, pharmaceutical, and food
industries. Notably, the French Intellectual Property Code imposes
sanctions and liability on those purchasing or even possessing
counterfeit items.155 Consumers of counterfeit goods may face a fine
of up to €300,000 (roughly $373,140) or three years imprisonment.156
French Customs has broad investigative and anti-counterfeiting
powers including the right to seize counterfeit products. Officials can
seize counterfeit goods at ports of entry and in the French
marketplaces.157 Anyone transporting products into or through France
must, therefore, possess documentation evidencing the true origin of
such products including, but not limited to, an agreement or an
invoice.158 Also, for the first time, tourists entering France could have
their counterfeit goods seized by customs despite the goods being
purchased outside of the country.159 Customs, the CNAC, and the
Comite Colbert continue to spread awareness about the new
regulations to all entering or living within France and the EU.

152. Sur Internet, unFfaux Produit Est-il Une Vraie Affiare, CNAC (last visited
Sept.
26,
2020),
http://www.cnaccontrefacon.fr/publication/content/ART17245.php?archive=0&StartRow=0&order
=1 [https://perma.cc/GD9K-Z6TV].
153. Securing the Leadership of the European High-End and Luxury Industry in
the Digital Era, EU. CULTURAL & CREATIVE INDUS. ALL. (Oct. 22, 2017),
http://www.comitecolbert.com/assets/files/paragraphes/fichiers/20/eccia_manifesto
_bd.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T2Z-A6KU].
154. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUAL [IPC] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE] art. 112-2, 123-1, 335-2 (Fr.).
155. Id.
156. Dianna Michelle Martinez, Note, Fashionably Late: Why the United States
Should Copy France And Italy To Reduce Counterfeiting, 32 B. U. INT’L L. J. 509,
524 (2014).
157. Id. at 525.
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VI. THE UNITED STATES V. ITALY & FRANCE
The United States’s attempts to fight counterfeiting markets by
targeting the supply side have remained feeble. To obtain meaningful
change and successfully limit the prevalence of trademark
counterfeiting, the United States should follow the Italian and French
models and adopt end-consumer penalties such as fines, confiscation,
or incarceration for situations in which the purchaser knew or should
have known that the item was a counterfeit.160 These aggressive
penalties must be accompanied by equally aggressive marketing and
awareness campaigns to inform consumers about the effects of
counterfeiting and the potential penalties for continuing to purchase
such goods.161 However, there are several downsides to implementing
end-consumer penalties. End-consumer penalties may criminalize
innocent purchasers who either did not know they were purchasing
counterfeit goods or knowingly purchased counterfeits to save money.
Additionally, end-consumer penalties are less favorable because the
United States has one of the world’s highest mass incarceration
rates.162 Incarcerating people for purchasing counterfeit goods goes
against the recent wave of reducing incarceration for non-violent
crimes. Lastly, end-consumer penalties do not address the influx of
counterfeit good production, particularly in the PRC, Hong Kong and
other southeast Asian countries. If the United States wishes to combat
the drastic proliferation of counterfeit goods produced in the PRC and
Hong Kong, then the United States government must implement
systems focused on helping businesses return some manufacturing and
distribution to the country, empowering unions and low-wage factory
workers, and protecting intellectual property rights. As a member of
several multinational treaties, the United States should consider a
more comprehensive approach that focuses on consumer awareness,
advocacy for trademark registration in Asian countries, increased
criminalization of counterfeit production and trafficking, and
improved customs’ seizures.

160. Kristoff Grospe, Proposed Law Targets Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods,
18 CITY L. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2012) (noting how bill sponsor, City Councilmember
Margaret Chin indicated that “substantial fines are something people understand”
and how the proposed law will “ultimately … cut down on the demand for these
illegal goods”).
161. Martinez, supra note 147, at 537–38.
162. Highest to Lowest Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://
www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_
taxonomy_tid=All [http://perma.cc/UZ2C-P5NC].
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VII. COMMENTARY ON PROPOSED ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
LEGISLATION
The legal and regulatory arsenals adopted by the United States,
European Union, Italy, and France do not address some of the societal
and economic issues mentioned in Part I regarding the PRC and Hong
Kong’s continued proliferation of counterfeit goods. The legal and
regulatory mechanisms can be likened to a band-aid on a bullet wound
because it only addresses counterfeit goods entering the respective
countries. These mechanisms do nothing to aid trademark owners in
demanding or assisting the Chinese government.
Fully combatting counterfeiting while improving and not
destroying international relations requires the aforementioned
comprehensive approach that focuses on consumer awareness,
advocacy for trademark registration in Asian countries, increased
criminalization of counterfeit production and trafficking, and
improved FTZ oversight and enforcement measures. Countries are
trying their best to improve the knowledge gap and work with the PRC
and Hong Kong (China) to combat counterfeiting. Countries must
cooperate to find reasonable solutions to the growing counterfeiting
problem that affects more than trademark owners; counterfeiting
affects everyone working in factories, storefronts, government,
administrative enforcement, and judicial systems alike.
A. Multi-National Intellectual Property Education Partnerships
One mechanism for combating counterfeiting is education.
Education remains essential because counterfeiting syndicates in the
PRC and Hong Kong lack the necessary knowledge of and respect for
intellectual property rights.163 Local protectionism has risen to the
forefront with the economic and societal benefits of counterfeiting
outweighing the social and economic harm caused to businesses
globally.164 While jobs increase in the PRC and Hong Kong,
trademark owners must respond to the increased counterfeiting by
cutting jobs in other countries to save the money needed to combat
counterfeiting. Educating Asian countries on the importance of
intellectual property rights can provide an opening for brand owners
and foreign governments to combat counterfeiting at its roots.
Education can also provide an opportunity for counterfeiting
syndicates to become legitimate manufacturers and distributors for
163. Chow, supra note 14, at 51.
164. Id. at 26–27.
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trademark owners in the Far East.165 This transition would not stop the
PRC and Hong Kong from obtaining financial benefits and employing
millions.166 Instead, the transition would open the door for more
cooperative and legal relationships between China, trademark owners,
and the Chinese society.
B. Reconsideration & Implementation of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement
The world needs a treaty like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (“ACTA”) now, more than ever before, to battle the highly
complex counterfeiting networks straddling multiple countries.167
Proposed in June 2008, the ACTA would have been one of the first
international agreements explicitly designed to combat counterfeiting
in a harmonized and coordinated way.168 Australia, Canada, Japan,
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the United
States signed the ACTA in October 2011.169 By 2012, Mexico, the EU,
and twenty-two EU member states signed the ACTA.170 Japan ratified
and formally approved the agreement. The ACTA provided a
multistep formula for combating counterfeiting through civil and
criminal enforcement, border measures, criminal offenses, penalties,
enforcement in e-commerce, and international cooperation.171
According to INTA, ACTA provisions should call for higher standards
and stronger cooperation on combating counterfeiting; stronger border
165. Id. at 51.
166. Id.
167. Businesses Press for High Standards in Anti-counterfeiting Treaty, INT’L
CHAMBER OF COMM. (Sept. 22, 2008), https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/newsspeeches/businesses-press-for-high-standards-in-anti-counterfeiting-treaty/
[https://perma.cc/39T4-6J7X].
168. Joint Statement on The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA),
EU. COMM’N
(Nov.
15,
2010),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_1504
[http://perma.cc/5F4C-7CF2].
169. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFF. OF THE U. S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/acta#:~:text=The%20United%20States%2C%20
Australia%2C%20Canada,trademark%20counterfeiting%20and%20copyright%20
piracy [http://perma.cc/34SL-4TX8].
170. Charles Arthur, Acta protests break out as EU states sign up to treaty, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
27,
2012,
4:43
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/jan/27/acta-protests-eu-states-signtreaty [http://perma.cc/Y2GB-JUM3].
171. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFF. OF THE U. S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta11
05_en.pdf [http://perma.cc//78FD-XRGJ].
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enforcement, especially with relation to goods in transit; more
effective criminal penalties; stronger international cooperation
between enforcement bodies of the signatory countries; and increased
cooperation between government and industry.172
Although some countries, including all EU countries, later rejected
ACTA,173 the agreement provided a baseline for global, trademark
protection against counterfeiting. Countries should reconsider the
ACTA, with minor changes, to protect consumers and trademark
owners who lose more than revenue. The agreement requires
implementation by most industrialized nations, including the PRC and
Hong Kong (China), to effectively combat counterfeiting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As globalization continues to flourish, the PRC and Hong Kong
remain the largest producers of counterfeit goods in the world because
such countries have no financial or social incentive to stop
counterfeiting. Mechanisms adopted by the United States, Italy, and
France are similar yet vastly different in their effect on curbing
counterfeiting. The United States model focuses on robust trademark
protections, narrow customs regulations, and criminal laws to reduce
trademark counterfeiting. Italy and France utilize detailed and robust
regulations and view criminal laws as a strong mechanism to
challenging the counterfeiting threat.
Until the world works with the PRC and Hong Kong to reform their
economic structure to rely less on counterfeiting and more on
legitimate businesses, the mechanism adopted by other countries will
continue to provide minimal relief to trademark owners. International
treaties, diplomacy, education, and FTZ enforcement are needed now
more than ever to improve intellectual property protection. It is
optimistic to think that the world will one day come together to resolve
this problem so that businesses feel protected as they expand globally,
but this optimistic yet compassionate view is necessary to combat one
of the fastest-growing global issues.
172. Businesses Press for High Standards in Anti-counterfeiting Treaty,
International Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 22, 2008), https://iccwbo.org/mediawall/news-speeches/businesses-press-for-high-standards-in-anti-counterfeitingtreaty/ [https://perma.cc/39T4-6J7X].
173. European Parliament Rejects ACTA, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Apr. 7, 2012
13:09),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/20120703IPR48247/european-parliament-rejects-acta
[http://perma.cc/H8G8-TFJ8].

